[ale] OT: Free Showing of "Invisible Ballots", Thursday, 3/16, 7:00pm, UUCA

[Jeff Hubbs]

"And hey, the great thing about paper ballots is that YOU HAVE THE 
BALLOTS. So you can do things like re-count them and examine them for 
evidence of tampering."

Yep - so learned Gaius Baltar!

Jeff

Charles Shapiro wrote:

> And hey, the great thing about paper ballots is that YOU HAVE THE 
> BALLOTS. So you can do things like re-count them and examine them for 
> evidence of tampering. At least you can determine whether fraud has 
> taken place. 
>
> Electronic voting records, by contrast, have no physical 
> manifestation. They can be changed, deleted, or added without the 
> possibility of an authoritative audit.
>
> -- CHS
>
>
> On 3/16/06, *Joe Knapka* <jknapka at kneuro.net 
> <mailto:jknapka at kneuro.net>> wrote:
>
>     Jim Popovitch wrote:
>     > While no one can say that electronic voting is 100% secure and
>     valid, it
>     > has also been shown (for decades) that manual voting is full of
>     fraud,
>     > much fraud.  There have been cases of paying people to vote,
>     dead people
>     > voting, etc. (btw, mostly for liberal leaning candidates).
>     >
>     > The technological solution at least offers means for
>     improvement. As we
>     > have seen recently in Georgia there is a large number of people
>     against
>     > showing proper ID to vote (even though they have to show ID to
>     cash a
>     > check at the bank).  So I say enable technology to solve the
>     problems
>     > that people themselves can't.  Should we trust everyone,
>     No.  But you
>     > have to trust someone, else your life is shallow and difficult. ;-)
>
>     I shouldn't have to trust *anyone* with my vote.  I should
>     be able to anonymously and securely verify that my vote,
>     as cast, has been properly accounted in election results.
>     It is perfectly possible to do this (see "Applied
>     Cryptography" by Bruce Schneier; there's a whole chapter
>     on election protocols), and clearly any such solution will
>     involve electronic voting.  However, existing electronic
>     voting systems do not implement anything like the proper
>     security measures, and are therefore far *more* vulnerable
>     to tampering than are paper ballots. With the Diebold
>     machines, a *single person* with the right password can
>     completely and un-traceably change election results (which
>     is just one among a great many other flaws). Yes, election
>     fraud has been committed with paper ballots, but at least
>     in that case, you need a conspiracy in order to accomplish
>     such a thing. So until a secure and voter-verifiable system
>     exists, just say no to electronic ballot boxes.
>
>     (And incidentally, "voter-verifiable" does NOT mean simply
>     printing out a copy of the ballot.  That's a meaningless
>     gesture whose purpose is merely to lull the sheep into
>     a false sense of security.)
>
>     -- JK
>
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