[ale] Its over. Maybe

[Michael Still]

Ok... I need to clear some things up..

On Wed, 03 Nov 2004 23:26:16 -0500, Jeff Hubbs <hbbs at comcast.net> wrote:
> Good thing your saying I'm equating the Diebold machines to the Borg
> doesn't "make it so!"
> 
> Just because they're not wired together in field use doesn't mean
> they're independent.  Their program is given to them before they're
> fielded, and while they're in use, they have potential to read data from
> and write data to the little cards; where the cards come from and where
> they go is unknown to me.  There certainly could be other forms of
> communication taking place of course (ultrasound, IR, RF), but I only
> know about the cards.  Therefore, even with just what is visible to me
> the voter, the means is in place to get the machines to act in concert
> and to redirect that action at will.
> 
> "based on my experience yesterday, [the machines] only record your vote
> on a memory-card to be read elsewhere."
> 

Ok the yellow cards you stuck in the machines did NOT record your
vote.  That information is recorded inside the black box.

What the card does is notify the poll workers whether a ballot was
cast or not and also verify that you are entitled to vote (token
auth).  When a poll worker picks up the smart card and stick it in the
handheld reader it displays one of two possible messages, one being to
clear the card for use again and another to notify that it has not
been used.  In the case of it not being used, then the poll worker
then knows that someone who has gone through the onsite 'registration'
process did not in fact cast a ballot (they got to the machine and had
cold feet).  The worker then knows that the count for votes should
then be subtracted by one in the final count to get it to add up
across the 3 areas (diebold machines, the roster that is filled in
where your name is printed, and then in the handwritten name list).

After the election is over a worker then pulls a pcmcia style flash
drive out of all the machines and drives them to the county election
office where each card is read into a server that counts up the votes.
If his car crashes and burns up then the votes can still be read from
the diebold machines from one of at least two other long term storage
devices.

The pcmcia cards are marked with a hash before the election and then
checked after the election to ensure the card is authenticated.  The
server is not connected to a network, runs win2000, and does nothing
all year until election day.  The county election officials are
instructed to lock the machine in a secure room, but I'm not sure if
this is enforced.  I would be sure to guess that in the bigger
counties it is locked up. The server has a tripwire type system check
that it goes through as well.  I'm not sure where the data goes from
there, but I am pretty sure it does not go to a central system via a
network of some sort.  My guess would be another pcmcia style card
that is mailed back and forth using the same hash style authentication
all the way to Cathy Cox's own system.

Cracking the Ga voting system using technology (or subverting) is not
as easy as you would think.  The system may still be vulnerable, but
it would take a major effort.