[ale] [Fwd: Re: [ale] Thoughts on Electronic Voting]

[msmith at mikeandmel.com]

I guess the only thing that could be done is have each
party review the code for hacks or cheats....


Charles Shapiro wrote:

> 
> Oops...
> 
> 
> > From: Charles Shapiro
<charles.shapiro at nubridges.com>
> > To: Jeff Hubbs <hbbs at attbi.com>
> > Subject: Re: [ale] Thoughts on Electronic Voting
> > Date: 06 Nov 2002 09:30:51 -0500
> > 
> > This is a very good essay which nicely sums up the
> problems in the
> > current Georgia voting method.
> > 
> > It contains a misconception about the voting
> mechanism. The smart card
> > you were handed contains no tallies, votes, or other
> unique information.
> > As the system was explained to me, it contains only
a
> boolean flag
> > indicating whether it has been inserted in a machine
> which was used to
> > cast a ballot. When you turn the card back in to the
> poll worker after
> > you vote, she clears that flag for the next use.
This
> prevents you from
> > going through the voting process twice, or going to
> another machine to
> > cast more votes for your candidates. All vote
tallies
> remain in the
> > voting machines. They're allegedly printed as well
as
> written to the
> > hard drive, although I cannot verify this part of
the
> story.
> > 
> > But I agree with the substance of your argument.
> > 
> > -- CHS
> > 
> > On Tue, 2002-11-05 at 21:36, Jeff Hubbs wrote:
> > > I've read a lot of the messages here and taken in
> some other information
> > > and I'd like to weigh in with some of my
> conclusions.
> > > 
> > > I don't have the practical expertise of the Bob
> Toxens of the world (not
> > > to belittle those of the rest of you who have
> similar geek stones of
> > > titanium), but I am an IT manager who has dealt
> with difficult issues of
> > > processing classified information, and in the
> course of that I developed
> > > mental approaches that served me well in that
> realm.  
> > > 
> > > Let me start off by informing your intuition with
a
> true story.  Ronald
> > > Dale Harris was a software engineer for Nevada's
> Gaming Control Board,
> > > and his job was to write software to prevent
> cheating in slot machines. 
> > > He hacked the slot machine code to produce cash
> jackpots when a certain
> > > sequence of coins was inserted.  He and his
> accomplices hacked over 30
> > > slot machines and would likely have gotten away
> with it except for those
> > > meddling kids...whoops, excuse me, I am the parent
> of a seven-year-old. 
> > > Anyway, one of Harris' buddies fingered him when
> the buddy was busted
> > > for trying to rig a Keno game.  
> > > 
> > > What can we learn from this?  The responsible
> agency for protecting the
> > > integrity of slot machine gambling hired several
> people who were
> > > motivated and determined to rig the machines to
> benefit them personally;
> > > there was no higher overseeing authority.  Except
> for the fact that one
> > > of them was caught committing another crime and
> then sang like a canary,
> > > the hack would very likely have never been
> detected.  Those of you who
> > > code or have coded, ask yourself:  could you
> determine if a program of
> > > significant size and complexity did something
other
> than or in addition
> > > to what it is supposed to do, especially when you
> have no idea what that
> > > additional behavior might be?  
> > > 
> > > A few years ago, a professional magician
supposedly
> angered magicians
> > > anywhere by going on national television, under
> cover of a mask and the
> > > nom de voyage "The Masked Magician," and
performing
> these marvelous
> > > magic tricks and then revealing in great detail
how
> they were done.  I'm
> > > no magic aficionado, but I watched the shows with
> great interest and
> > > afterwards I pondered about the purported
> controversy that The Masked
> > > Magician caused.  While I realized that TMM was
> deflating the
> > > professional magician's stock in trade with each
> segment of his shows,
> > > it occurred to me that TMM was serving a higher
> purpose.  He was
> > > exploring the nature and methods of mass
deception,
> with magic as his
> > > medium.  Viewers who watched his shows - even
> viewers of average
> > > intelligence - might be just a little bit more
> likely to believe or at
> > > least wonder if a given occurence is some sort of
> trick.  TMM's tricks
> > > often had common elements to them, e.g., the
> "palm," misdirection,
> > > substitution, concealment.  It isn't hard to see
> those same kinds of
> > > things going on in any other kind of deception
that
> gets the lid blown
> > > off of it (Enron, "We had no warning prior to
> 9/11," "I did not have
> > > sexual relations with that woman," "I am not a
> crook," "freedom to
> > > innovate")
> > > 
> > > And now we have a computer-based voting system in
> which voters don't
> > > even have a way to verify that the card they turn
> in actually has their
> > > vote encoded into it.  When I ask myself questions
> like "Who has the
> > > ability to manipulate these results?" or "Who has
> write access to the
> > > code these machines run?" I realize that not only
> do I not know the
> > > answers, but I have no WAY to know the answers. 
> When I ask myself "At
> > > what points in the process could the process be
> manipulated?" I come up
> > > with lots of answers - there are points that I
> *can* observe there in
> > > the polling place and there are points that I
> *cannot* observe.  So, the
> > > conclusion that I come to is that the opportunity
> for one or more people
> > > to deliberately subvert the election process has
> grown and that the
> > > likelihood of any subversion being executed out of
> view has likewise
> > > grown.   
> > > 
> > > Inasmuch as I know that it would be possible to
> design and deploy
> > > electronic voting systems with a high level of
> integrity, their inherent
> > > complexity makes auditability by reasonable means
> impossible.  You can
> > > write in all the crypto you want, and it can be
> "walked around" by
> > > simple trickery (is it not possible that these
> voting machines are
> > > wirelessly networked?).
> > > 
> > > I therefore call for an end to "black box" voting
> systems of all sorts. 
> > > I want it to be possible for independent parties
to
> audit voting results
> > > incontrovertably.  I don't care if the systems use
> nothing more advanced
> > > than brass cogs; I want something that's
examinable
> in full.
> > > 
> > > - Jeff
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > ---
> > > This message has been sent through the ALE general
> discussion list.
> > > See <a
href="http://mail.mikeandmel.com/jump/http://www.ale.org/mailing-lists.shtml">http://www.ale.org/mailing-lists.shtml</a> for more
> info. Problems should be 
> > > sent to listmaster at ale dot org.
> > > 
> > 
> 
> 
> ---
> This message has been sent through the ALE general
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Michael Smith
AIM: MikAtlanta
MSN: MikeAshtonSmith
email: msmith at mikeandmel.com

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