[ale] Is there any way to stop this travesty? -- NO, of course not!

SanMillan, Todd tis3 at cdc.gov
Fri Aug 23 14:16:11 EDT 2002


The deeper problem with electronic voting is the lack of an audit trail.
See RISKS LIST http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/21.12.html#subj1.1 for an
intro.  These are all closed source systems that are "self-auditing".
Meaning that once the election results are reported, there is no possibility
of a recount to verify results.  If there are systemic problems, how can you
rely on the system to find and report errors?

-----Original Message-----
From: Jim [mailto:jcphil at mindspring.com] 
To: ale at ale.org
Sent: Friday, August 23, 2002 1:25 PM
To: Keith R. Watson; Irv Mullins; ale at ale.org
Subject: Re: [ale] Is there any way to stop this travesty? -- NO, of course
not!


On Friday 23 August 2002 01:09 pm, Keith R. Watson wrote:
> Irv,
>
> The quoted article:
>
>
http://www.accessatlanta.com/ajc/epaper/editions/today/metro_d3569ddbd46e52
>e d0013.html
>
> said the following:
>
> "Diebold officials say its machines have been used in elections in
> Maryland, Virginia, Indiana and California with few reported problems."

Going back to my earlier comments on systems for financial services,
Diebold, 
of course has great experience in this area. They were originally a 
manufacturer of safes, but they also make ATM's for banks. ATM networks are 
wonders of redundancy and reliability. So, if anybody could pull this off, I

would think it would be the people at Diebold.

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